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“POUR-OVER ’FROM A WILL TO AN 
INTER VIVOS TRUST
Eugene J. M ocklerf
I. INTRODUCTION
FREEDOM TO DISPOSE OF P R O P E R TY B Y  WILL
The freedom to dispose of property by will has been en­
trenched in the English law for many centuries now, and in Canada 
we enjoy that same freedom. It was with the intention of prevent­
ing frauds and insuring that this freedom was not abused that the 
Statute of Wills of 1540, the Statute of Frauds of 1677 (providing 
for attestation and that Wills of personalty be in writing), and the 
Wills Act of 1837 were passed. Clearly, the license to devise and 
bequeath property requires that the law protect rightful heirs 
from fraudelent wills. Thus, like many freedoms, we find the 
freedom to dispose of property by will circumscribed and limited 
by the necessity of complying with legal formalaties. The policy 
of the law in this regard was sound at its inception and remains 
beneficial to this day.
Accepting, then, that the freedom to dispose of property by 
will is not absolute but requires compliance with certain formal­
ities, the issues in individual cases are often reduced (and right­
fully so) to the judicial determination of the requisite degree of 
that compliance. It is in this light that the so-called pour-over will 
arises in our law.
WHA T  IS  A POUR-OVER WILL
A pour-overwill is simply a will which, either with or without 
other directions and bequests, “pours-over” the testator’s prop­
erty to an inter-vivos or “living” trust. The trust may or may not 
be one created by the testator; it may or may not be revocable; it 
may or may not contain powers of amendment or modification 
in favour of the settlor.
M ember o f the law firm of Hoyt, M ockler, Allen and D ixon, Fredericton, 
New Brunswick, and lecturer in law at the University o f New Brunswick. This 
paper was prepared by Mr. M ockler and delivered at the m eeting of the Can­
adian Bar Association in Vancouver in 1967. It was updated by Marcus L. 
Jewett in 1970 but has not been brought forward to 1975. It is believed, how­
ever, to accurately reflect the present Canadian position.
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REASO N S FOR POUR-OVERS
The reasons favouring creation of an inter-vivos trust with a 
pour-over will may be summarized as follows;1
1. Unification of administration of trust and probate corpus, 
in that management of the trust property will not be in­
terrupted by the death of the settlor;
2. Minimization of administration expenses;
3. Avoidance of costly court supervision and accounting 
procedures required of the testamentary trustee;
4. More flexibility of administration, in that the consoli­
dated trust and estate corpus leads to greater diversi­
fication and less risk;
5. Minimization of income, trust, estate and inheritance 
taxes;
6. G reater degree of certainty over trust amendments;
7. G rantor of trust is able to determine the competency 
and discretion of the trustee who will manage the prop­
erty after the grantor’s death;
8. Avoidance of any family publicity attaching to the pro­
bate of the will;
9. Avoidance of ancillary administration of estate assets 
located in another jurisdiction;
10. Creditors may find greater difficulty in reaching trust 
property than nontrust property;
11. Any heirs who contest the will may find it more difficult 
to upset a long established trust than a will;
12. Choice of jurisdiction in which the trust is to be adminis­
tered. This choice is severely limited in the case of testa­
mentary trusts in jurisdictions in which the courts have 
retained control over testamentary trusts (e.g. Caliornia).
Without debating the efficacy of any of these reasons, this 
paper will deal with some problems that arise in the use of pour- 
overs. There is little, if any, Canadian legal writing on this subject, 
but it is by no means a new problem to our law. On the other hand, 
copious material has been published on the topic in the United 
States and it is from that material that most of the research for 
this paper was done. In addition to legal writing and judicial pro­
nouncements, the Americans have seen fit to enact statutes in
1 See Kajan. P our-O ver Trust, 13 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 544, 557 (1964).
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many jurisd ictions2 attem pting to obviate some of the problem s 
that have arisen.
II. VALIDITY OF POUR-OVERS
The central issue is w hether a testa to r may by a properly 
executed will d irect that his executors pay over to the trustees 
of a trust previously established (or in fact crea ted  later) all o r 
part of his property , to be dealt with in accordance with the term s 
of the trust. In m ost cases the trust will not have been executed in 
accordance with the form alities required  by the Wills Act. It is 
with such trusts that this paper will deal. Also of concern  is w hether 
the trust is revocable or irrevocable and w hether it is am endable or 
unam endable. Basically, this m atter gives rise to a discussion of 
the doctrine of incorporation  by reference and the doctrine of 
facts of independent legal significance. It would seem that there 
are no problem s if the testa to r repeats the term s of the trust in 
the will itself.
A. POUR-OVER TO A N  IRREVOCABLE AND
UNAMENDABLE TRUST
W here a trust is irrevocable and unam endable no problem  
arises. A disposition to such a trust is valid. This rule is true for the 
United States, C anada and E ngland.1 So long as the trust is in ex­
istence and the will refers to it as a presently existing docum ent 
then it will be incorporated  by reference. In re Johnson4 seem ed to 
uphold the pour-over on the grounds of a gift to a distinct and 
separate entity, namely, U.B.C. If the trust is not in existence 
at the m aking of the will but is created  subsequently there can be 
no incorporation  by reference. Scott m aintains5 that such wills 
should be upheld on the doctrine of facts of independent signifi­
cance. This m atter will be dealt with m ore fully in connection with 
the revocable trust.
B. POUR-OVER TO A REVOCABLE OR
AMENDABLE TRUST
Real difficulties arise where the pour-over is to a revocable 
or am endable trust. The difficulties are com pounded if the trust 
is in fact am ended before the testa tor's death . Thus the inquiry
2 Either the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, promulgated in 
I960, or amendments to existing statutes which substantially embody its pro­
visions have been adopted in all 50 states.
3 In M atter o f  Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 ( 1932); In re Johnson ( 1961),
30 D.L.R. (2d) 474; In re Playfair, (1951] Ch. 4
4 11961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 474.
5 1 Scott, The Law o f Trusts 391 (3rd ed. 1967).
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into this problem  m ust com m ence with the question: Can there 
be a legal pour-over to an am endable living trust? Only if this 
question is answ ered affirmatively need inquiry go further to see 
if a subsequent am endm ent affects what would otherw ise be a 
valid disposition.
F o r C anadians, the w ords of H. Allan Leal, Q .C ., form er D ean 
of O sgoode Hall, and som etim e C hairm an of the O ntario  Law 
Reform  Com m ission, are notew orthy on this question. Referring 
to the question of pour-overs to a revocable o r am endable trust 
he said “. . . under present decisions it probably cannot be done 
with safety and should not be attem pted .”6 He based his conclu­
sion on  the English decision of In The Goods o f Smart.1 In this 
case the pour-over was held invalid on the grounds that the trust 
docum ent was “fu tu re” and thus not a “presently existing docu­
m ent” as required  by the doctrine of incorporation  by reference. 
T o  the like effect is University College o f North Wales v. Taylor* 
where a testa to r left property to the University subject to such 
rules “as are contained in any m em orandum  am ongst my papers 
w ritten or signed by me relating th ere to ”. Even though evidence 
was adduced  to show that a m em orandum  was in existence in 
1905 when the will was m ade, the C ourt held there could be no 
incorporation  because the testa tor clearly intended to include any 
rules m ade by him up to the m om ent of death.
In In Re Hardy,9 the Nova Scotia Suprem e C ourt held that 
a testa to r could not make a gift by his will to trustees of a valid 
and subsisting trust and give instructions as to its disposition at 
a later da te , e ither by parol o r in writing. The judgm ent cites the 
English decision of In Re Jones10 as an authority  for this proposi­
tion. It was pointed out in the Hardy case that there was no pres­
ently existing docum ent to be incorporated  at the date of the will. 
Indeed, the basic issue cen tred  around the disposition m ade in 
the will to the executors, who were given a pow er to appoint 
such property. A ccording to the evidence of the solicitor who 
drew  the will the power was to be exercised only in accordance 
with and upon the instructions of the testator.
6 Leal. The Revocable Trust and Pour Over Wills, 1 Real Prop. Prob. &Tr. J. 
286 (1966).
7 [19021 p. 238.
8 119081 p. 140.
9 [19521 2 D.L.R. 768.
10 119421 Ch. 328.
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T here  may be some doubt as to the accuracy of D ean Leal’s 
conclusion in view of some English and A m erican decisions. 
T here  can, however, be no question about the accuracy of his 
exhortation for proceeding with caution in this area.
1. English Decisions
T here  is a trilogy of English cases that bear on this m atter. 
The first is In Re Jones. 11 In this case the testa to r m ade a bequest 
to trustees on the trusts contained in the docum ent “executed by 
me bearing even date  with this my last will and testam ent o r any 
substitution therefor or m odification thereof o r addition thereto  
which I may hereafter execu te”. A deed poll appointing the trusts 
was executed  the same day as the will, though it is not c lear w hether 
before o r after the will. The C ourt held the bequest ineffective 
even though the trust instrum ent had not been changed after 
execution of the will. The decision was based prim arily on the 
rule that evidence of docum ents which might have com e into 
existence after the will was executed could not be adm itted, i.e., 
the C ourt could look only to  the will itself. Thus, the C ourt was 
left with the original docum ents, which contem plated  the possi­
bility of future docum ents. T his uncertain ty  left the bequest in­
valid. T he decision, said the C ourt, was one of principle and was 
arrived at even though counsel for the trustees pointed out that 
the trust had not in fact been altered.
One w riter has term ed the rationale of this decision “refined 
nonsense”.12 One is tem pted to agree with his conclusion. Yet 
the decision does not by any m eans rule out the pour-over will. 
Indeed, the Court suggested that if the will had been w orded a 
little differently the result m ight have been avoided, for although 
the validity of any la ter am endm ents was rejected , the concept 
of incorporation was accepted . Simonds J. said:
I must add, for the sake of clarity, that a somewhat different form 
of words in the gift may lead to a different conclusion. If, for instance, 
the testator directs his trustees to hold a sum of money on the trusts 
of an existing indentifiable document, unless he substitutes some other 
document therefor, it may be that evidence is admissible to show whether 
or not he has purported to substitute a new document, and that the orig­
inal gift will stand or fall accordingly; though in no event could the trusts 
of the new document have testamentary validity. In such a case, the 
substitution of the new document might perhaps be treated like any 
other event or condition mentioned by the testator; as, for example, 
“unless I shall before my death have gone to Rome". That is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case.1
11 Ibid.
12 Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee o f an Inter-Vivos Trust, 
50 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1951).
13 119421 Ch. 328, 331.
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The next decision is In Re Edwards Will Trust, Dalgleish v. 
Leighton, M H ere, the C ourt of Appeal very clearly accepted  incor­
poration  by reference of an am endable inter-vivos trust. It is 
instructive to analyze this case with some care. T he facts may be 
sum m arized as follows: On O ctober 16, 1936, the testa to r executed 
an inter-vivos trust settling 100 pounds. Clause 2 of the trust instru­
m ent d irected  that the trust fund and incom e be paid as the settlor 
m ight by subsequent m em orandum  d irect and, in default, then  to 
such persons as the managing trustee in his d iscretion might direct. 
Clause 3 of the trust stated that “subject to  the provisions of the 
preceding clause” the trust fund and one-half of the incom e there­
from  were to be held for the benefit of the wife during her life and 
then to children at age twenty-one. On the same day, the testa to r 
executed a will and gave all residuary property  to  trustees of 
settlem ent “subject to the powers and provisions therein  declared 
and contained so far as such trusts, pow ers and provisions are 
subsisting and capable of taking effect”. On D ecem ber 21, 1937, 
the testa to r executed a m em orandum  directing the trustees of 
the settlem ent to raise ou t of the proceeds and subject to the 
trusts many thousands of pounds. At this point there was yet only 
100 pounds in the trust. On the death  of the testa tor, subsequent 
to those events, the validity of the will was questioned.
In the C ourt below 15 Jenkins J. had held that the will was 
not valid since both clauses 2 and 3 of the trust could not be 
validly incorporated  in the will.
The C ourt of A ppeal (Lord G reene M .R., Som ervell and 
C ohen L.JJ.) held the will valid .16 Lord G reene M.R. found:
1. T he testa to r had m ade his testam entary  wishes clear.
2. T he entire trust could be incorporated  in the will by refer­
ence since there was no problem  of identification.
3. Since the docum ent was in existence at the date  of the 
will there would be no problem  in leading evidence to 
identify it.
4. O nce the entire trust was read as part of the will then it 
becam e necessary to see if each clause was valid.
5. Clause 2 was not valid but this did not affect the validity 
of clause 3 of the trust, which had been incorporated .
14 119481 1 All E.R. 821.
15 (1947) 2 All E.R. 521.
16 [19481 1 All E.R. 821.
56 U.N.B. LA W JOURNAL
In his judgm ent Lord G reene said:
The result of his having in that identifiable document included 
something which the law does not allow to have effect is a matter to be 
considered after probate when the question of the validity of his testa­
mentary dispositions arises. The result, therefore, is that we have here, 
so to speak, a composite will consisting of a combination of the provi­
sions of the actual will itself plus those of the settlement.
. . .  I read the words “subject to the provisions of the preceding clause" 
at the beginning of cl. 3 in what appears to me to be the natural meaning, 
viz. in so far as under the provisions of the preceding clause the residuary 
estate shall not have been effectively dealt with in fact, but also effec­
tively dealt with in law, and, in so far as an attempt under cl. 2 to deal 
with the property fails, not from any lack of intention on the part of the 
testator or any insufficiency of language, but because some rule of law 
makes it incapable of achievement, then 1 think the words “subject to 
the provisions of the preceding clause" are apt to meet such a case. If 
there has been no effective disposition of the residue under cl. 2, which 
as a matter of law there could not be, cl. 3 has its natural effect.
. . .  It seems to me that the directions for incorporation are directions to 
read into the will the entirety of a document which the testator, no doubt, 
thought would be effective, but if, on writing them into the will, it turns 
out that part of them is invalid from some rule of law, as in the present 
case, I cannot read the testator’s directions as meaning that, therefore, 
the whole process of incorporation must be abandoned.17
It is interesting to note that two different w riters have arrived 
at two diam etrically opposed conclusions on the effect of In Re 
Edwards Will Trust. Professor Palm er cites it as authority  for al­
lowing pour-overs to an am endable tru s t.18 Professor Lauritzen 
cites it as authority  for the opposite conclusion .19 Before drawing 
any conclusion, one should first look at In Re Schintz’s Will Trust,20 
which is the third case in the trilogy of English decisions and was d e­
cided subsequent to the articles of Professors Palm er and Lauritzen.
The Schintz decision attem pts a rationalization of the decisions 
in In Re Jones and in In Re Edwards Will Trust. In the Schintz case 
a settlor reserved to himself in the deed  of settlem ent pow er “at any 
time ‘by d eed ’ revocable and irrevocable” to declare further trusts 
for the benefit of nam ed persons and for that purpose to revoke the 
provisions of the settlem ent. Subsequently he m ade a will and di­
rected  that shares of his residuary estate  should be held by the 
trustees of the settlem ent on the trusts therein declared  and the
17 Id., 824-25.
18 Palmer, supra note 12, at 42.
19 Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by Reference?, 45 111. 
L. Rev. 583 (1950).
20 [1951] Ch. 870.
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deed o r deeds which m ight “h ereafter be executed under the 
pow er of revocation and declaration  of new trusts thereby re ­
served or as near there to  as circum stances will adm it”.
The court held tha t the gifts of the residue were valid and 
they incorporated  the whole of the trusts of the settlem ent. This 
incorporation  included the reserved pow er of the settlor of the 
trust to declare new trusts by subsequent deeds, but, since such 
pow er offended against the Wills A ct of 1837, it was ineffective. 
This did not, however, affect the validity of the o th er incorporated  
trusts. The C ourt analyzed the decision in In Re Jones and pointed 
ou t that the pow ers that had been reserved in tha t case were m uch 
broader than the ones reserved in the case before it. Indeed, the 
C ourt seem ed to place g reat em phasis upon the pow er which had 
been contained in the Jones case of substitution for the original 
trusts. A lthough this is a valid point insofar as the b readth  of the 
reservation is concerned , nonetheless clause 10 of the deed of 
s e t t le m e n t in th e  Schintz case  d id  n o t a llow  fo r  c o m p le te ly  
new trusts to be created ; indeed, the words of clause 10 were to 
the effect that the settlor could change the trusts and for that pur­
pose “wholly or partially to revoke and m ake void the trusts, 
powers and provisions herein dec la red”.
Logically, it is difficult to see why the difference in wording 
of the am ending pow er should be very significant in the legal 
result. If there is a pow er to alter o r am end, w hether it be by way 
of com plete substitution of new trusts o r simply by way of lim ited 
substitution of new trusts o r simply by way of lim ited substitution, 
then the C ourt will still be incorporating, in effect, a future deed 
of the settlor, and this is the contam inating elem ent. The breadth  
of the pow er of reservation has absolutely nothing to do with the 
point under consideration  at that stage.
Clause 17 of the Schintz will stated , am ong o ther things, 
that the share should be held “under o r by virtue of the said settle ­
m ent and the deed or deeds (if any) which may hereafter be ex­
ecuted  by me under the pow er of reservation or revocation and de­
claration of new trusts and thereby reserved to me or as near 
thereto  as circum stances will adm it”. The C ourt looked at this 
provision and said that if it were to trea t it as “opera tive” then 
clearly the decision of Simonds J. in In Re Jones would be applic­
able and the whole clause would have to be trea ted  as invalid. In 
his judgm ent in the Schintz case, W ynn-Parry J. cam e to the con ­
clusion that he did not have to trea t this clause as “opera tive” 
and stated that it was no m ore than descriptive of the term s of the 
settlem ent. He accepted  the argum ent of Mr. Cross, counsel for 
several of the defendants, that if similar words had been inserted 
in the will in the Edwards case then the C ourt of Appeal would
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not have com e to  any different conclusion.
Should any distinction be m ade based on the ex ten t of the 
am ending power? If this pow er m erely goes to the adm inistrative 
provisions of the trust then there is strong argum ent for saying 
it ought not to affect the issue. If, on the o th er hand, it goes to 
the dispositive provisions a stronger case can be m ade for taking 
it into account. But even then, as we have seen from  the Schintz 
case, a court m ight a ttem p t to subdivide am ending pow ers into 
those that are broad and those that are lim ited. This of course 
can have no o ther result than to create  havoc and uncertain ty  in 
the law.
It is interesting to note that the Schintz case contains elem ents 
of both the Jones case and the Edwards case. T hat is to say, there 
was a pow er of revocation o r a reservation of the pow er to a lter or 
am end in the trust, bu t in the Edwards case it was not set ou t in 
the will. In the Jones case there was a reference to subsequent 
am endm ents that might be made in the will itself. The same was 
true of the Schintz case, even though the court refers to it as a 
descriptive clause, ra th e r than an operative one. Some attem pts 
have been m ade to rationalize these decisions on this point, but, 
as R.E. M egarry points ou t in his effort to reconcile these cases:
On a superficial view, the distinction between the two older cases 
depends on whether or not the will expressly refers to a subsequent deed; 
but Re Schintz's Will Trusts has shown that this would have put the em­
phasis on the wrong point. What matters, it seems, is whether the tes­
tator is attempting to give effect to an assortment of present and future 
deeds, or merely to an existing deed. In the former case, the whole at­
tempt at incorporation fails; in the latter case, it matters not that the 
deed contains powers of revocation and appointment, nor whether the 
will refers to these powers, for the court will incorporate the deed but 
strike out the powers. The problem is difficult and the line thin, but, 
with respect, the distinction that has now been made seems convincing.21
2. United States Decisions
In Shetland  v. Shetland11 the C ourt of E rrors and Appeals 
of New Jersey held th a t it was not m aterial that the inter-vivos 
trust was revocable by the settlor. The C ourt held that the trust 
agreem ent, not being testam entary , could be referred  to in order 
to ascertain  the term s of the testam entary  trust. T he C ourt said;
By it the testator merely added additional property to a trust fund 
established by him years before the execution of his will under a valid, 
active trust, and to which he had from time to time during his lifetime 
added securities. The trust to which this bequest is added is not theor­
21 (1951), 67 L.Q. Rev. 444.
22 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928).
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etical, nebulous, intangible, or incapable of identification, but exists 
in fact, and the trustee legatee is as distinct and definite an entity as 
would have been an individual or corporation legatee.23
The A m erican courts have generally been willing to uphold 
pour-overs to an am endable trust. Thus, in both England and the 
U nited States we may conclude tha t pour-overs to  am endable 
trusts will be upheld. T he next problem , then, is to  decide what 
will be the effect of a subsequent am endm ent to  the trust which is 
executed  w ithout com plying with the form alities of the Wills Act.
3. Subsequent Amendments
Logically, the am endm ent problem  could be solved in two 
ways: (1) trea t the will as though it were re-executed on the day of 
the am endm ent to the trust, so that there  is a re-incorporation; 
(2) trea t the am endm ent as a future act by the testa to r of inde­
pendent significance. T he second of these solutions is m ore closely 
akin to  orthodox legal analysis, while the first is probably m ore 
closely akin to w hat the testa to r thought he was doing or desired 
to do. Y et the first involves the creation  of a fiction; i.e., re ­
execution and re-incorporation .
Professor Scott m aintains24 that the am endm ent problem  can 
be b roken  down into th ree questions, namely:
(1) Is the testam entary  disposition also m odified?
(2) D oes the testam entary  disposition follow the original 
term s of the inter-vivos trust?
(3) D oes it fail altogether?
In discussing this problem , reference will be m ade only to 
U nited S tates decisions, since there do not appear to be any 
English or C anadian cases on point. The U.S. decisions are not 
uniform  on this point, but the A m erican courts have narrow ed the 
problem  to  w hether or no t the doctrine of facts of independent 
legal significance (or non-testam entary acts) should be applied 
to uphold the disposition. T ha t is to say, should the revocable 
trust and even the am endm ents be trea ted  as facts of independent 
significance on which the court may receive extrinsic evidence to 
give validity to the dispositions of a will. T he U nited S tates d e ­
cisions are relevant for C anadian purposes since the A m erican 
laws of wills have, in the main, been derived directly  from  English 
law, and judicial doctrines such as incorporation  by reference and 
independent legal significance have been adopted  by A m erican 
courts.
23 Id., at 279-80 of 14() Atl.
24 1 Scott, supra note 5, at 396.
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DOCTRINES OF FACTS OF INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE
Before dealing with the U nited S tates decisions it may be 
useful to review briefly the doctrine of facts of independent legal 
significance. A landm ark in this regard is the decision xnStubbs 
v. Stubbs,25 w here p roperty  was left by will “unto  and am ongst 
my partners who shall be in co-partnership with me at the time of 
my decease or to  whom I may have disposed of my said business...” 
T he testatrix  disposed of her business during her lifetime and the 
bequest was upheld to  give the property to those who obtained 
the business. C learly this was a non-testam entary act, to which 
the court said it could look with a view to in terpreting the will. 
In o ther words, the language of the will was related  to  the facts 
that had an independent significance. T here  are also cases deal­
ing with dispositions of the “con ten ts of my desk”26 and to “ser­
vants in my em ploy at my dea th ”.27 These dispositions have been 
universally upheld.
The theory of independent significance is based upon the 
principles of in terp re ta tion  of wills, a theory quite d ifferent from 
that of incorporation  by reference. In Sanford v. Raikes,28 Sir 
William G ran t m ade it clear that the two notions were quite dif­
ferent. Sir William said:
I had always understood that, where the subject of the devise was 
described by reference to some extrinsic fact, it was not merely compe­
tent, but necessary, to admit extrinsic evidence to ascertain the fact, and, 
through that medium, to ascertain the subject of the devise. I do not see 
what this has to do with cases where there is a reference to some paper 
that is to make a part of the Will. There it may be contended that the 
Will itself must specify the paper that is to be incorporated into it. Here 
the question is, not upon the devise, but upon the subject of it. Nothing 
is offered in explanation of the Will, or in addition to it. The evidence 
is only to ascertain what is included in the description which the Testa­
tor has given of the thing devised.29
C om m enting on this quotation, it is stated  in Jarman on Wills:
Nor is it material that the description makes the objects of gift to depend 
upon circumstances or acts of persons which are future and contingent, 
or even upon the future acts of the testator himself, though this is some­
times resisted as contravening the principle of the statutory requisition 
of attesting witnesses. There seems, however, to be no valid ground for 
the objection. Every description must more or less involve inquiry into 
extrinsic facts,- and there is no reason why the ascertainment of the ob­
25 (1837), 2 Keen 255, 48 E.R. 626.
26 In re Robson. [1891] 2 Ch. 559.
27 Re Howell's Trusts, [1937) 3 All E.R. 647.
28 (1816), 1 Mer. 646, 35 E.R. 8()8.
29 Id., at 811 of 35 E.R.
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jects may not depend as well upon the facts or conduct, past or future, 
of the testator, as upon any other contingent circumstance.30
One A m erican w riter has pointed  out tha t justification of the 
pour-over will on the theory of independent significance is accep t­
able bu t may give rise to  an easy avoidance of the form alities for 
m aking wills.31 If, for instance, the revocable trust is instituted 
with a very small corpus with a view to pouring-over, then the trust 
is not a fact of very great significance. Palm er, on the o ther hand, 
thought that the m ere fact of the trust being nom inal should make 
no difference in working out this p rob lem .32
U.S. DECISIONS ON SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
M ost of the U nited States cases have been collated by Pro­
fessor Palm er33 and Professor Scott.34 T hree  decisions, however, 
are of particu lar relevance to this paper. The first is Atwood  v. 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.35
In the A twood  case the deceden t established an inter-vivos 
trust with a corpus of some two million dollars, reserving the power 
to “annul, change or m odify” the term s of the trust. T he incom e 
was to be paid to the settlor for life; at his death  cash am ounts 
were to be paid to nam ed beneficiaries and the balance of the 
corpus was to  be held in trust to pay the incom e to his widow and 
ano ther for their lives, with the corpus then to be d istributed to 
o ther beneficiaries in stated  fractional am ounts. On the same day 
the settlor also m ade a will in which he left the residue of his estate 
to  the trustee of the inter-vivos trusts, “to  be held, m anaged and 
disposed of as a part of the principal of the estate and property 
held by it in t r u s t . . .  in the same m anner as though the proceeds 
of such sales had been deposited by me as a part of said trust es­
ta te”. T hereafter the settlor twice am ended the trust by naming 
additional cash beneficiaries and by elim inating a gift of $3,000.00 
to one Amelia. The effect of these am endm ents was not in issue. 
T he cash gifts were paid ou t of the trust corpus to the nam ed bene­
ficiaries, including those designated in the am endm ents, and no 
issue was m ade with respect to this action. T he effect of the a t­
tem pted revocation of the gift to Am elia was not passed upon be­
30 Jarman on Wills 525 (8th ed. 1951).
31 Polasky, Pour-Over Wills and the Statutory Blessing, 98 Trusts & Estates 
949 (1959).
32 Palmer, supra note 12, at 69.
33 Id.
34 1 Scott, supra note 5, s.54.3.
35 275 F. 513 (1st Cir. 1921).
62 U.N.B. LA W JOURNAL
cause she was not a party  to  the proceedings. The issue on which 
the C ourt did pass concerned  the validity of the entire residuary 
disposition. T he holding against validity was based on the fact that 
the settlor had reserved the pow er to am end the trust, not upon 
the fact that the pow er was exercised after execution of the will.
Judge Bingham dissented in the Atwood  case. It is a powerful 
dissent and will repay reading. His approach was strict but ac­
curate. He analyzed the issues in this way:
(a) Look first to the will and you see that it does not refer to a trust in­
strument but to a trust fund. It is an absolute disposition to the trus­
tee and not a reservation of the power of disposal.
(b) Look next to the trust deed and you see that it does not in any way 
refer to the will or attempt a disposition of the residue of the testator's 
estate. Thus, it is simply not a testamentary disposition.
Judge Bingham w ent on to point ou t that the majority found 
the testa tor by his will intended to refer to the trust deed as a paper 
o r writing which was to be incorporated  as it stood at m aking the 
will o r as it m ight later be am ended. In his view, however, the 
language of the will showed an in tention to refer to the trust fund 
as an extraneous fact as it existed when the will was m ade or should 
exist at his death  for the purpose of identifying beneficiaries and 
defining their shares. Judge Bingham supported  his in te rp re ta ­
tion on the basis of the absolute disposition contained in the will.
The m ajority in the A tw ood  case would not stretch  the facts to 
fit within the independent significance doctrine because in their 
view the cases showed this doctrine applied only where the act did 
not depend entirely upon the volition of the testator. R eference to 
persons in the em ploy of the testa to r at his death  represented  an 
act of volition by both the testa to r and the person. On this point 
the majority seem ed to be overly conservative. Judge Bingham, 
in his dissent, cited D enio C.J. in Langdon v. Astor's Executors.36 
This citation sheds m uch light on this otherw ise shadowed terrain. 
Bingham J. quoted  Chief Justice D enio as follows:
There is no principle in the law which forbids the making of testamentary 
gifts dependent upon the happening or not happening of any event in 
the future, whether in the testator’s lifetime or afterwards. A bequest 
may be made with a provision that it shall not be operative if the legatee 
shall in the testator’s lifetime receive a particular sum of money from 
another person, or if he shall within that time become entitled to an 
estate as the heir or legatee of another. So a testator may very properly 
provide that a legacy given in his will shall not be operative if he shall 
in his lifetime give the legatee the like sum. This is not the reservation of 
a license to alter or revoke his will by an unattested paper. The fact 
which is to destroy the legacy in such a case is not a change of purpose.
36 16 N.Y. 9, 25 (1857).
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a new act of testamentary volition, which requires an instrument in 
writing clothed with testamentary forms. The gift inter-vivos is in fact 
in pais, which does not require a writing and the effect given to it, of 
superceding and extinguishing the legacy, is prescribed by the will it­
self, and is authenticated in the same manner as the legacy, of which it 
is in fact a part. It differs, it is true, from a condition which looks to the 
act of a third person, or the happening of an event in respect to which 
the testator is to have no agency; and I concede that a testator cannot 
prescribe in his will that an act to be performed by him indifferent in 
itself and having no pertinency except its effect upon his testamentary 
dispositions, shall change such dispositions. Such a provision would allow 
a testator to alter his will otherwise than by an attested instrument. He 
cannot therefore declare that any mere entry in his books or other writ­
ing without attestation according to the statute, shall in itself have any 
effect upon the provisions of his will. But the bestowal of a substantial 
sum of money or amount of property is an act of a different kind. It is 
a pecuniary transaction belonging to the actual business of life. It is an 
act which he may perform whether he has made a will or not. It effects 
a substantial change in the pecuniary condition both of the testator 
and the donnee. * * * The circumstance which is to determine whether 
the testamentary gift shall be operative at the testator's death is, in this 
case, an act taking effect in praesenti, and is one of those transactions of 
business which every owner of property may perform for its own sake, 
and without reference to its operation upon any instrument he may 
have executed. There is nothing in the policy of the law requiring it to 
be proved by other than the usual evidence. There is no special danger 
that it may be stimulated or set up by false testimony against the truth of 
the case. Not being promissory or executory in its character, but taking 
effect as it does eo instanti, with the volition of which it is the result, 
there is no danger that it may be done without a due appreciation of its 
character; as testaments, promises and other engagements, looking to 
the future for their consummation may be and frequently are. It has 
not one of the characteristics of a testamentary act, and there is not, in 
my opinion, anything in the law that requires that it should be authenti­
cated by testamentary formalities.17
M assachusetts law at one point held that the testam entary  
disposition did not fail and the original instrum ent, though not 
the am endm ent, was incorporated  by reference .38 This state of the 
law in M assachusetts was altered  by Second Bank-State Street Trust 
Pinion.39 In this case a tes ta to r left the residue of his estate to the 
trustee under a revocable and am endable inter-vivos trust estab ­
lished by him and his wife under date of “Septem ber 13, 1945, 
as am ended”. At the execution  of the will, the inter-vivos trust 
was am ended. T hereafter the testa tor died and the executor asked 
to be instructed w hether the residue passed to the trustee to hold
37 275 F. 513, 531-32 (1st Cir. 1921).
38 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland , 291 Mass. 380, 1% N.E. 920 (1935).
39 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E. 2d 350 (1960).
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under the trust as am ended, or, if not, subject to  the term s of the 
unam ended trust, o r how it should be d istributed. It was held 
that the trustee should d istribute the funds received from the ex- 
cu to r in accordance with the term s of the am ended trust. The 
C ourt said that this result could not be reached  under the doc­
trine of incorporation by reference, but that the doctrine of facts 
of independent significance was applicable even though this re­
sult was in opposition to the form er state of the law as enunciated  
in the Old Colony Trust Company case. The C ourt stated that in 
the Old Colony case the doctrine of independent significance had 
not been relied on by counsel.
The next decision is Canal National Bank v. Chapman.*0 This 
is a decision of the M aine courts and follows the Second Bank- 
State Street Trust case. The facts were that the testatrix executed 
her will on Septem ber 24, 1948, and died January 31, 1960. The 
will left the residue to the trustee of an am endable inter-vivos 
trust crea ted  by the testatrix in 1934. T he trust was am ended in 
1942, 1948 and 1955. T he 1955 am endm ent was executed w ithout 
the form alities of the Wills Act, i.e., there was only one witness. 
The C ourt stated that the cardinal rule in the construction  of wills 
was to give effect insofar as possible to the in tentions of the tes­
tator, and found that the testatrix  in this case obviously intended 
the trust to stand as am ended. The C ourt held the doctrine of in­
corporation  by reference could not be used since the 1955 am end­
m ent was not in existence when the will was executed. Relying 
upon the Restatement (Second) o f Trusts,*1 the C ourt upheld the 
bequest.
Both the Second Bank-State Street Trust and Canal National 
Bank cases relied on the Restatement for the decision. Each is 
based on the theory that, insofar as possible, the C ourt should give 
effect to the intentions of the testator. In addition to this rule the 
doctrine of facts of independent significance was used as support 
for the decision.
It cannot be doubted  that these decisions represent an ex­
trem ely broad application of this doctrine. T he rule was judicially 
created  to give validity to otherw ise uncertain  bequests. In this 
respect it was lim ited to identifying the subject or object of the 
gift and it found its most useful application in what might be 
term ed subsidiary parts of the will. Thus, devises of the contents 
of a desk and devises to em ployees have always been upheld .42 In
4() 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961).
41 Restatement tSecondI o f Trusts, s.54 (1959).
42 Supra, notes 26, 27.
both  of these exam ples, the desk and the persons who are the em ­
ployees at the date  of death  are facts of independent significance. 
But is this doctrine capable of validating gifts to a revocable and 
am endable trust, after the trust has been am ended?
Looking back to the judges who created  and nurtu red  the 
doctrine of facts of independent significance, it is difficult in the 
extrem e to  conceive that they felt it could be so broadened. In­
deed, w here a separate docum ent, such as a trust agreem ent, is 
in existence, the courts have always looked to the doctrine of in­
corporation  by reference to use it with the will. If this view is not 
taken and the doctrine of independent significance is given broad 
scope then the trust is, in effect, being viewed as a separate entity. 
This, of course, does not accord  with generally accep ted  notions 
of trust law. It can be argued with force that the trust is m uch m ore 
than a fact of independent significance. It is form al and deliberate. 
It will deal with the dispositions of p roperty  and the adm inistrative 
duties devolving on the trustee. Things of this nature were never 
before a ttached  to the doctrine of facts of independent signifi­
cance, and thus the analogy betw een those cases supporting the 
doctrine and the pour-over will situation breaks down. It becom es 
a case of apples and oranges, the only similarity being that they 
are both fruit. This was the conclusion at which Professor Lauritzen 
arrived. A fter a review of the cases he said:
It is submitted that this analysis of the applicable, cases shows that 
an inter-vivos trust cannot be given testamentary validity by referring 
to it as an act of independent legal significance. Any such attempt is 
barred by the well-settled rule that a testamentary trust must be set 
forth in the will or in some document validly incorporated therein. The 
non-testamentary act doctrine serves a useful purpose and when kept 
within accepted bounds, its application is recognized by virtually all 
courts. But it is clear that this doctrine cannot be expanded to cover the 
reference in a will to an unattested document and every court which has 
carefully considered the question has expressly rejected the attempt to 
extend the application of this doctrine in this fashion.
. .  . Thus, it appears that the theory of referring to a revocable trust 
as an act of independent legal significance has no support among the 
decided cases. On the contrary, the courts have almost unanimously 
turned thumbs down on this and similar devices because they realize 
that ‘no multiplication of words or refinements can alter the result 
above stated that [the testator] had by this plan sought prospectively 
to create for himself the power to dispose of property vested in him at 
the time of his death by instruments not executed in accordance with 
the statute of wills’.43
It should be noted that the Second Bank-State Street Trust 
and the Canal National Bank cases had not been decided when 
Lauritzen w rote.
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On the o ther hand, Professor Palm er, also writing before 
these cases were decided ,44 advocated their result. His thesis was 
based on the rule of giving effect to the tes ta to r’s intentions.
C ertainly, Professor Scott advocates upholding pour-overs 
to an am endable trust, even w here the trust is am ended. He states:
These cases seem eminently sound. Not only are they in accordance 
with the general principles of the law of wills permitting a resort to facts 
of independent significance, but they do not violate the sphere of those 
principles. They do not open the door to chicanery or mistake. In many 
states, as we shall see, it is now provided by statute that a devise or be­
quest to the trustees of an inter-vivos trust shall not be invalid because 
the trust is amendable or because it was amended after the execution 
of the will.45
4. U.S. LEGISLATION
This whole m atter has received the a tten tion  of legislators 
in the U nited States. M ost states have adopted  some form of 
legislation on pour-over wills, and a num ber46 have adopted the 
U niform  T estam entary  A dditions to Trusts Act, which was prom ul­
gated in 1960. The U niform  A ct seeks to validate pour-over wills 
and states:
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determinable by the 
law of this state, may be made by a will to the trustee or trustees of a 
trust established or to be established by the testator or by the testator and 
some other person or persons or by some other person or persons (includ­
ing a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the trustor has re­
served any or all rightsof ownership of the insurance contracts) if the trust 
is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written 
instrument (other than a will) executed before or concurrently with the 
execution of the testator’s will or in the valid last will of a person who has 
predeceased the testator (regardless of the existence, size or character 
of the corpus of the trust). The devise or bequest shall not be invalid 
because the trust is amendable or revocable, or both, or because the 
trust was amended after the execution of the will or after the death of 
the testator. Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the property 
so devised or bequeathed (a) shall not be deemed to be held under a 
testamentary trust of the testator but shall become a part of the trust to 
which it is given and (b) shall be administered and disposed of in accor­
dance with the provisions of the instrument or will setting forth the terms 
of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before the death 
of the testator (regardless of whether made before or after the execu­
tion of the testator's will) and, if the testator’s will so provides, including 
any amendment to the trust made after the death of the testator. A re­
vocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator 
shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse.
44 Palmer, supra note 12.
45 1 Scott, supra note 5, at 4()2.
46 Id., 409 &n. 40. From 1967 to 1974 fourteen ( 14) more states adopted the pro­
vision bringing the total to 33.
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This provision has been dealt with by Professor Alan Polasky47 
and a num ber of o ther writers, and it is not proposed to deal with 
it in this paper.
III. CONCLUSION
WHA T SHOULD CANADIAN REACTION BE?
Is it possible to break new ground in this field? Could pour- 
overs to am endable trusts be upheld in the first instance on the 
groundsof incorporation  by reference with a severance of the power 
to am end? Then, if the testa to r had in fact am ended, could such an 
am endm ent be treated  as an act of independent significance? This 
com bination of the two doctrines would be useful and would go far 
in giving life to the wishes of the testa to r which, after all, is the goal 
being sought. T o  do this would not be so very m uch unlike what the 
law now allows in validating gifts to servants o r to persons to whom 
the testa to r may have sold his business.
Any Canadian province that adopts legislation should, however, 
m ake provision for o ther possible problem s that might arise. One 
such problem  is found in Section 12(1) of the New Brunswick Wills 
A ct.48 Pursuant to this Section (and all o th e r provinces49 except 
Q uebec have substantially the same provision), if A is an attesting 
witness to the te sta to r’s will then any devise o r bequest under the 
will to A ’s wife is void, although A is nonetheless com peten t to  prove 
the will. Now assume that A is an attesting w itness to the tes ta to r’s 
will which pours-over into a living trust. Suppose that A’s wife is a 
beneficiary under the inter-vivos trust. In these circum stances is 
the gift to A’s wife void?
If our law as it stands an irrevocable living trust can be incor­
porated  by reference and this problem  could easily arise in that con­
text. One could argue that the gift to  A’s wife would be valid since 
there has not been, strictly speaking, a non-com pliance with the 
Wills Act. Y et under the doctrine of incorporation  by reference the 
term s of the trust are incorporated  as if they had been w ritten into
47 Polasky, supra note 31, at 949.
48 S.N.B. 1959, c.15.
49 Alberta: R.S.A. 1955, c. 369, s. 12(1).
British Columbia: R.S.B.C. I960, c. 408, s. 12(1). 
Manitoba: R.S.M. 1954, c. 293, s. 11.
Newfoundland: R.S.Nfld. 1952, c. 147, s. 7.
Nova Scotia: R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 340, s. 11.
Ontario: R.S.O. 1960, c. 433, s. 16.
Prince Edward Island: R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 124, s. 77. 
Saskatchewan: R.S.S. 1965, c. 127, s. 12.
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the will. On this basis the gift would no t be valid. Now w hen this 
problem  is p rojected  to an am endable trust which is la ter am ended, 
perhaps even to include A’s wife in the la ter am endm ent, it is clear 
tha t any future legislation in this field should be drafted  with pre­
cision and after careful study.50
Obviously, in view of the great d ivergence of opinion in this 
subject the best way to deal with the m atte r in C anada is to  enact 
legislation that perm its pour-overs to an am endable trust. As a m atter 
of policy this would seem to be desirable. T he theory upon which the 
form alities for executing wills is based is still relevant. Y et m ost pro­
vinces now allow holograph wills. This change dem onstrates an eas­
ing in form alities. T o perm it pour-overs to  an am endable trust and 
to include subsequent am endm ents would raise no real difficulties 
in safeguarding the policy involved here. A fter all, trust docum ents 
are a ttended  with substantial solem nity and form ality and quite 
possibly less liklihood of fraud arises than  with holograph wills.
From  both the English and A m erican decisions this fact em erges 
suprem e: The legal conclusion on the validity of a pour-over will 
is influenced beyond reasonable p roportions by the nuances of 
language chosen in drafting the pour-over. This, of course, will be 
no great shock to lawyers, since it is a com m onplace to have m atters 
turn on words. Y et in the area of testam entary  dispositions m ore 
effort is perhaps w arranted tow ard achieving the testa to r’s intentions 
than in becom ing the w orld’s cham pion “hair splitter”. A uniform  
legislative policy could help expand the frontiers of testam entary  
freedom .
50 The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act validates the gift in the 
circumstances outlined.
